MANILA, Philippines – It’s been a week since the BRP Teresa Magbanua, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)’s shiny and new 97-meter Japan-made vessel, was forced to pull out from Escoda Shoal in the West Philippine Sea.
National Maritime Council (NMC) spokesperson Alexander Lopez, according to a September 21 Inquirer report, said a replacement ship was already close to the shoal. But he said the same thing a day after the Magbanua pulled out in the first place.
In a text message to Rappler, Lopez said “the general area is well covered and monitored by our government [maritime] assets.” He offered no other details.
This time, the government seems less keen on telegraphing — through the media or other means (such as a notice to mariners) — its plans in the West Philippine Sea.
For the media, it’s an unnerving shift and a stark contrast to the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS)’s year-old “transparency initiative,” which, during many maritime missions meant either having reporters aboard the PCG ships or media in Manila getting videos, photos, and a detailed breakdown of the mission a day after.
In March, the Philippine military posted, in near real-time, videos of a mission to Ayungin Shoal that resulted in “heavy damage” on its contracted civilian ship. (Tensions have significantly gone down in Ayungin, following a July 2024 “provisional agreement” on resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre.)
For a considerable handful in the Philippine government, the selective silence — or at least an attempt at some opacity — is welcome. It should come as no surprise that the transparency initiative has as many critics as well as believers.
Rappler’s editor-at-large Marites Vitug, writing for Foreign Affairs, noted that President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. “does need to take care not to push his transparency policy too.” “It risks adding fuel to the fire should disclosures prove too inflammatory in Beijing,” she added.
Ayungin Shoal is settled. Scarborough is not, but it’ll take a while to resolve China’s occupation and control of the shoal. What of Escoda?
We’ve written about this in the past, but it bears repeating: Escoda or Sabina Shoal used to be an obscure feature in the West Philippine Sea, mentioned only in passing during resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal since it was a staging area. Tensions only really ramped up in the low tide elevation after the Magbanua started what would become a five-month-long vigil.
But now that she’s gone and another vessel is waiting in the wings, what’s next?
Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo, in a chance interview after his agency’s budget deliberations in the Senate on September 19, reiterated that no deals were made during the last Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea meeting between Manila and Beijing, at least not in relation to the Magbanua’s pullout.
The DFA, in a statement on the meeting, said the delegation led by Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro “[emphasized] that Escoda Shoal is within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines” and “reaffirmed the consistent position of the Philippines and explored ways to lower the tension in the area.”
Just three days after that statement, the source of tensions was forced to eventually leave — its crew beaten and battered, its commanding officer in tears because they wanted to stay longer.
The rollercoaster of bilateral tensions in the West Philippine Sea, at least relative to Escoda, has hit a welcome but uneasy low. But as it always seems to be the case under the second Marcos administration — how long will that calm last?
The Philippines in New York
Speaking of the South China Sea, tensions in this part of the world are expected to be the focus of discussions in New York, on the sidelines of the 79th UN General Assembly.
Manalo is leading the Philippine delegation, and will be speaking on behalf of the Philippines in the General Debate — his second time to do so under the Marcos administration. (Marcos was in New York during the 2022 edition of the General Debate — his first trip to the United States after Washington promised an arrest warrant would not be enforced if he visited.)
A lot of important meetings are happening during High-Level week, including the Summit of the Future, the High-Level Meeting on Sea-Level Rise, the High-level Meeting on Antimicrobial Resistance, and High-level Meeting: International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
But it’s likely a side meeting — not a summit — that’ll pique the interest (and maybe the ire) of many in the region: a gathering to discuss maritime security in the South China Sea.
Manila’s envoy to Manila, the President’s cousin, Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez, had earlier framed the planned meeting as countries “[banding] together and [giving] a message to China.” Romualdez said the “summit” would see participants joining the Philippines “finding ways to be able to talk some sense into the PRC [People’s Republic of China].”
Manalo played coy when asked about the planned meeting, which sources said is being organized by the United States, the Netherlands, and possibly a third Western country. “I think if I’m invited, I will go. Well, I heard that some other countries are organizing it,” was all Manalo told Filipino reporters before flying out.
Asked if he would raise the Philippine experience in the South China Se, Manalo said: “Of course, we are very much involved in the need for security and promoting a region of stability especially in the West Philippine Sea and of course in other areas.”
What we are certainly looking out for is the attendees of the meeting. Will it be the usual chorus of friends, allies, and “like-minded countries” that are quick to issue statements in support of the Philippines when it’s harassed by China in the West Philippine Sea?
Or will we see new names and faces in a meeting that at least one diplomat (Romualdez) is building up to be an (informal) intervention on the Asian superpower’s violent tendencies at sea? – Rappler.com
